The history of Greece after the Balkan Wars and the Catastrophe of Asia Minor is that of a massive ongoing power struggle between populist/republican forces seeking wealth redistribution and a conservative/royalist faction defending a status quo with origins in the Ottoman era, subsequently legitimized by the dominant world powers of each generation.

This struggle has expressed itself in constitutional crises, military coups, periods of dictatorship , and outright civil war. The period after the military dictatorship 1967-1973 was particularly crucial for Greece, as it harbored the threat of major social unrest fueled by longstanding grievances and egregious societal inequities. The need for a manageable populist alternative was evident after the initial euphoria generated by regime change waned.

In 1980, an American-trained economist, with a republican pedigree swept to power promising ‘change’. The center-left forces provided a comfortable majority, but their initial enthusiasm and electoral commitment could only be sustained with tangible gains. After social ‘window-dressing’ with belated recognition of the National Resistance and acceptance of the spoken dialect for official transactions had been effected, societal restructuring became mandatory to accommodate cadres and scores of prospective voters. This was achieved by dramatically expanding the public sector at all levels and exhibiting largesse in previously neglected rural areas. The funds to finance this enterprise were derived from credit arrangements, thus avoiding the need for wealth redistribution through efficient taxation or other means.

By the year 2000, it was obvious that existing financial strategies could not sustain the social contract indefinitely, making it necessary to obtain access to larger pools of funds through ‘innovative’ accounting. Goldman Sachs expertise streamlined the Greek application for admittance to the Eurozone, thus sealing the fate of the nation in a perpetual credit cycle. Funds flowed into public coffers earmarked for grandiose infrastructure projects, only to sustain a non-viable social construct on suspended animation. Interestingly, Greek banking institutions did not fall prey to the temptation of casino economics and remained fiscally conservative, but were strong-armed nonetheless to lend the government, through bond purchases, in its financial free fall.
And now, as the emperors of global finance are revealed to be naked, the game is up. Margin calls are terminated and creditors have to own up to their debts in an accelerated fashion. The social contract artificially sustained is fractured and the postponed issues of wealth redistribution are once again emerging amidst the fragmented electorate. The confrontation of forces in this developing cataclysm promises a modern Salamis.